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INTRODUCTION 
 
Students of Scotland have the difficult task of attempting to understand the identities 
of a population increasingly divided by values and beliefs. While this could be said of 
any population, identifying what Scots have or hold in common can be difficult. The 
Scots lack both a state2 and many important cultural bulwarks like language which 
demarcate other nations.3 Those factors which have been used to define the Scots seem 
especially prone to shift even when agreed upon, especially exemplified by ‘religion’. 
In this article I address the theoretical issues surrounding the relationship between 
‘religion’ and ‘national’ identity in contemporary Scotland. To this end, the theoretical 
literature of religious studies and nationalism studies is examined, to find an 
analytically fruitful means of discussing this topic. This will include the distinction 
between general (emic) and scholarly (etic) application of these terms and as well as 
the question of how to define them.  
The scope of this article is necessarily quite limited in two ways.  Firstly, because it 
takes a particularly broad perspective on religion in Scotland to relate this data to 
comparative theoretical debates and secondly because it is concerned with 
contemporary Scotland rather than earlier periods of Scottish history. It will attempt to 
provide a broad overview of different Scottish communities and refer to historical 
developments to account for the contemporary religious landscape. However, it cannot 
 
1 This article is based on a paper presented at the Scottish Religion and Cultures Network conference 
held at Tulliallan police training college, 24-25 October 2014. It reflects an immediate post-referendum 
context and does not address subsequent issues such as the impact of the referendum on UK withdrawal 
from the EU (‘Brexit’) in 2016.  
 
2 Though Scotland was not stateless for most of its history. It was an independent kingdom before the 
Act of Union with England in 1707. The matter of Scotland’s ‘statelessness’ is complicated not only by 
the reestablishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 but the fact that several distinctive state-like 
institutions were maintained after union such as a separate education system, civil service, legal system 
(Scots Law) and, most importantly for our purposes, a distinct established church – the Church of 
Scotland. See Thomas M. Devine, The Scottish Nation: A Modern History (London: Penguin, 2012), pp. 
3-16. See below for a discussion of Scotland’s ‘statelessness’. 
 
3 David McCrone, Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Stateless Nation (London: Routledge, 
1992), p. 174. The population of Scotland is overwhelmingly anglophone but there are two traditional 
languages of the country: Scots Gaelic and Lallans Scots or more commonly Scots. Scots Gaelic is a 
Celtic language largely found in the Western Isles and West Highlands, with 59,000 self-reported 
speakers. Lallans is closely related to English (sometimes described as a dialect) with 1.5 million self-
reported speakers (though its porous boundary with Scottish English makes it difficult to enumerate) 
spoken largely in the south and east. See National Records of Scotland, 2011 Census: Key results on 
Population, Ethnicity, Identity, Language, Religion, Health, Housing and Accommodation in Scotland – 
Release 2A (Edinburgh: Crown Copyright, 2013), p. 3. 
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claim to do full justice to any of the religious groups discussed, their history or to 
broader national history.  
I argue that religious and national identities in Scotland can be treated as quite 
separate despite the fact that they both refer to social groups. This is partially because 
‘religious’ and ‘national’ affiliations are treated as separate classifications of an 
individual’s identity according to the secular and pluralist discourses prevalent in 
contemporary Scotland. This is facilitated by the fact that national symbols and historic 
memory are related to and appropriated selectively by actors at a time when religious 
symbols and historic memory have lost their once overwhelming significance. While 
boundary markers are significant for all social groups, when these are no longer 
‘religiously’ defined, Scottish national belonging can be combined with diverse 
religious affiliation.  
The distinctiveness of the characteristics and constitution of such categories mean 
that they often do not or cannot compete and can be readily combined. Religious 
affiliation is often more global in scope while national identity is restricted to a limited 
territory and demographic. These distinctions lend themselves to modern discourse that 
treats these as distinctive, non-overlapping categories. While scholars should challenge 
this rigid distinction, I argue that there are grounds for treating them as distinctive 
comparative scholarly classifications as well.  
      
IDENTITIES IN CONTEMPORARY SCOTLAND 
    
Such ambivalence about identity among the Scots was arguably reflected in the 
referendum on Scottish Independence held on the 18 September 2014 with 55% voting 
against and 45% voting for independence.4 Despite this disagreement about the 
institutionalisation of Scottish national identity, there is actually evidence of wider 
agreement about nationality. Complicated issues can be obscured by the mutually 
exclusive and dualistic categories which referendums impose. The referendum could 
be mischaracterised as a competition between ‘Scottish’ and ‘British’ national 
identities, but the 2011 census tells a different story: under ‘nationality’ 83% of 
respondents identified as ‘Scottish’. Notably, while the correlation cannot be taken to 
be absolute, 83% claimed Scottish birth,5 suggesting that growing up in Scotland 
imbues some form of Scottish national identity (though this article is concerned with 
the population resident in Scotland rather than those born or raised in Scotland which 
could include substantial emigrant populations).  
As a scholar of religion, I am interested in how ‘religion’ affects assertion and 
perception of ‘Scottishness’? What do Scots think the place or role of religion is in 
contemporary Scotland? What impact do specific religious affiliations (including 
affiliation as ‘non-religious’) have? How are different identities jostled, separated or 
intertwined? How do Scots relate to Scotland’s long religious history or to the 
contemporary religious landscape?  
The Church of Scotland continues to form the established national church and its 
Presbyterian brand of Protestantism was once considered a pillar of Scotland’s stateless 
 
4 ‘Scottish Independence Referendum: Final Results in Full’, The Guardian, 19 September (2014). At:  
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/ng-interactive/2014/sep/18/-sp-scottish-independence-
referendum-results-in-full. Accessed 15 June 2015.  
 
5 National Records of Scotland, 2011 Census, p. 3. 
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national identity after the union with England in 1707. Though a substantial Roman 
Catholic minority persisted in the country after the Reformation, especially in some 
rural areas, the Catholic community in Scotland was bolstered by Irish and to a lesser 
extent Italian and Lithuanian immigration from the nineteenth century onwards. 
Unfortunately, this also led to persistent sectarian tensions which made confessional 
identities particularly salient.6    
Regardless of this long religious history, Scotland is increasingly secular despite the 
historic predominance of Christianity in the country. Whatever they think it entails, 
Scots overwhelmingly claim a common national identity but not a common religious 
affiliation. According to the census only 32% of respondents now identify with the 
Church of Scotland while 37% identify as having ‘no religion’. Only 54% of 
respondents identified as ‘Christian’ overall which includes the 16% of respondents 
claiming Roman Catholicism. These figures are rounded off by 1.4% ‘Muslim’ and 
0.7% shared between ‘Buddhist’, ‘Hindu’ and ‘Sikh’ respondents, and around six 
thousand (0.1%) Jewish respondents.7  
Scotland’s non-Christian religious minorities have a greater impact than these 
figures would suggest and the discourse of a ‘multi-faith’ society is significant. This is 
partially because members of these communities have visibly engaged with public life 
in Scotland which has a big impact in a ‘wee country’. Alongside this, religious 
minorities are concentrated in the cities8 which are centres of power, business and 
media. Many urban Christians or Atheists are likely to have more contact with their 
Muslim or Sikh neighbours than with the Free Presbyterians of Lewis on the country’s 
‘Calvinist fringe’ despite the fact that Free Presbyterian churches once represented a 
substantial proportion of Scots across the country who seceded from the Church of 
Scotland, especially after the Great Disruption of 1843.9 This is not to suggest that the 
urban population should be taken as more important or representative than the rural 
population, merely that the manner in which ‘religion’ in Scotland is perceived is highly 
situational.  
The increasing religious diversity of Scotland is apparent when the 2011 census is 
compared to the previous census in 2001. It coincides with the decline of formal 
Christian affiliation and increasing adherence to liberal and secular values. The relative 
predominance of these values, however, has not gone without challenge from certain 
quarters. The Christian Solas Centre for Public Christianity continues to assert the 
significance of Christianity in Scottish public life in its campaigns.10 The former head 
of the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland Cardinal Keith O’Brien, vocally challenged 
liberal-secularist thinking on issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage. His threat 
 
6 Devine The Scottish Nation, p. 379, pp. 486-500. See also Steve Bruce, No Pope of Rome: Anti-
Catholicism in Modern Scotland (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1985). 
 
7 National Records of Scotland, 2011 Census, p. 4. When these figures are aggregated 5.9% of the 
population is unaccounted for. For an analysis of the Scottish Muslim population see Stefano Bonino, 
‘Scottish Muslims through a Decade of Change: Wounded by the Stigma, Healed by Islam, Rescued by 
Scotland’, Scottish Affairs Vol. 24, No. 1 (2015): pp. 78-105 
 
8 National Records of Scotland, 2011 Census, p. 2. For a sociological analysis of minority communities 
and diversity in the 2011 census see Ross Bond, ‘Minorities and Diversity in Scotland: Evidence from 
the 2011 Census’, Scottish Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2017), pp. 23-47. 
 
9 See Devine The Scottish Nation, pp. 370-378.  
10 Solas Centre for Public Christianity. At:  http://www.solas-cpc.org/. Accessed 15 June 2015. 
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to deny communion to Catholic Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) who voted 
against Catholic teachings11 was regarded as an intrusion by many, but he has left 
something of a vacuum since his resignation in the light of revelations of sexual 
improprieties against trainee priests.12 
Regardless of the specifics of how Scots categorise themselves in terms of 
‘nationality’ and ‘religion’, these classifications are important. Yet we should not treat 
this as given, as natural or universal, simply because it is familiar. National and 
religious identities are part of inculcated patterns of thought and learned behaviour; in 
a census, questions are asked and answers given. Individuals have learned to classify 
themselves in multiple ways which fit into broader, separable systems of classification, 
‘national’ and ‘religious’. When filling in the census, individuals classify themselves 
according to specific collective identities, such as ‘Christian’ or ‘Scottish’, and know 
which is ‘religious’ and which ‘national’. These names for groups themselves are ‘first 
order’ classifications and the general classifications of these classifications are ‘second 
order’ classifications or ‘names of names’.13      
                                               
EMIC AND ETIC 
 
The understanding, terminology and definitions which people in a social group operate 
with are ‘emic’, while those employed by scholars to classify, analyse and explain are 
‘etic’. These are used for a very different purpose; while the emic and the etic may 
overlap considerably (or even use the same word), etic terms are stipulative, defined 
and explicated for the purposes of the study.14 As Jonathan Z. Smith argued scholars 
‘imagine religion’ through their works,15 they play a crucial role in constructing  the 
definition of ‘religion’ as distinctive in their text and disseminated to their audience. 
The definition of ‘religion’ used in a study may match common understandings of the 
term, or it may be idiosyncratic, but must play the role of highlighting and analysing 
something identifiable.  
The concept of ‘religion’ that Western scholars work with, like concepts such as 
‘nationality’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘culture’, ‘society’ and so on, is not universal but rather a 
product of a specific Western history of ideas, although increasingly transported (and 
often indigenised) around the world. This does not mean that many of the features 
classified by these terms are absent in cultures other than the West, but rather there 
were no equivalent concepts which exactly matched those familiar to us. Some scholars 
 
11 Dan Bell, ‘Two Dunblanes a Day: Scots Cardinal Attacks Abortion “Massacres”,’ The Guardian, 
1June (2007). At: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2007/jun/01/health.religion. Accessed 15 June 
2015. 
 
12 Catherine Deveney, ‘UK Top Cardinal Accused of “Inappropriate Acts” by Priests’, The Observer, 23 
February (2013). At: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/23/cardinal-keith-o-brien-accused-
inappropriate. Accessed 15 June 2015. 
 
13 Jonathan Z. Smith, ‘Classification’, in Willi Braun and Russell T. McCutcheon (eds.), Guide to the 
Study of Religion (London: Continuum, 2000), p. 35. 
 
14 Russell T. McCutcheon, Critics Not Caretakers: Redescribing the Public Study of Religion (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 2007), pp. 63-65. 
 
15 Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), p. xi.  
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advocate not using the term ‘religion’ at all,16 but if one is interested specifically in the 
features which are usually identified as ‘religion’, and one wishes to use the data 
comparatively then it remains useful. Whether an explicit definition is offered or not, 
scholars always impose their perspectives on the data, and may have an implicit idea of 
‘religion’ which affects their presentation and analysis of data.17 Adopting a specific 
working definition ensures clarity and openness; one can either impose one’s own folk 
categories implicitly or specialised categories explicitly. 
 The term ‘emic’ refers to any folk-category, understanding or usage outside of the 
narrow scholarly purview. Traditionally in religious studies the prevailing terms were 
‘insider’ and ‘outsider’, distinguishing the categories and perspectives indigenous and 
alien to specific religious traditions. The problem with this distinction as opposed to the 
more general emic-etic distinction, is that the former may lead to the reification of 
traditions as static and monolithic, exaggerate boundaries and replicate the perspectives 
of a privileged segment.  
I believe that tentative distinctions between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ discourse can be 
useful if the fluidity and diversity of religious groups are recognised. For example, a 
nineteenth century Scottish missionary society would describe itself as ‘religious’ 
(insider-emic) as would a Scottish historian studying them in an analytical rather than 
confessional sense (insider-etic). The society might have sent its missionaries to an 
Indian village where a variety of beliefs and practices were referred to by them as 
‘religious’ (‘outsider-emic’) and by the locals as ‘Dharma’ (insider-emic). This 
historical situation will most likely be described and analysed by the historian in terms 
of the meeting of two ‘religions’ (outsider-etic).18       
Does any of this matter in the case of Scotland? The Scots are largely anglophone 
Western Europeans, for whom these concepts are indigenous. However, what if some 
of the Indian villagers whose practices had acquired the labels ‘Hindu’ and ‘religious’ 
began to emigrate to Scotland? They may employ these terms in order to be understood 
by their neighbours but also because the label ‘religious’ conveyed respectability. The 
term would also be significant for joining local and national networks of ‘religious’ or 
‘interfaith’ groups.19 In other contexts, the label ‘religion’ may have negative 
connotations, and practitioners may prefer to stress ‘Dharma’ or perhaps ‘philosophy’ 
or ‘way of life’. Different members of such a community may stress different labels at 
 
16 Timothy Fitzgerald, The Ideology of Religious Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 26. 
 
17 Jan G. Platvoet, ‘To Define or Not to Define: The Problem of the Definition of Religion’, in Jan G. 
Platvoet and Arie L. Molendijk (eds), The Pragmatics of Defining Religion: Contexts, Concepts and 
Contests (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 252-253. 
 
18 Kim Knott, ‘Insider/Outsider Perspectives’, in John R. Hinnells (ed.), The Routledge Companion to 
the Study of Religion (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 243-258. For a study of Scottish 
missionaries in nineteenth and early twentieth century India see Phillip Constable ‘Scottish Missionaries, 
“Protestant Hinduism” and the Scottish Sense of Empire and Early Twentieth Century India’, The 
Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 86, No. 2 (2007), pp. 278-313. For a study of a Hindu community in 
Edinburgh see Malory Nye, ‘A Place for Our Gods’: The Construction of an Edinburgh Hindu Temple 
Community (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1995).   
 
19 See Liam T. Sutherland, ‘Unity in Diversity: Representations of Religious Minorities in the Literature 
of Interfaith Scotland’, Journal of the British Association for the Study of Religion, Vol. 20 (2018), pp. 
145-168. 
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different times for their own reasons and scholars cannot always mirror this because 
their aims are different, to describe and analyse a social group.  
 
DEFINING RELIGION 
 
In religious studies defining ‘religion’ and the degree to which ‘religion’ can be treated 
as something universal and separate from other social factors is a perennial concern. In 
general, the idea of religion as an independent or sui generis factor has been critiqued; 
many of the key social scientific thinkers such as Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim and 
Sigmund Freud argued that religion was merely a reflection of socio-economic, 
political or psychological factors. Though few contemporary theorists would go this 
far, few would recognise religion as sui generis.  
The fact that ‘religion’ would seem to refer neither to a universal concept or even an 
independent factor creates seemingly interminable difficulties with defining religion. 
However, I would argue that the problem can be overcome by approaches which are 
neither theological nor over-extensive. In the social sciences, definitions of religion 
have often followed one of two major paths the ‘substantive’ and the ‘functional’, 
forged by the founders of social anthropology and sociology, Edward Burnett Tylor and 
Émile Durkheim, respectively. Substantive definitions relate to content while 
functional definitions relate to role.20 Tylor described his definition as ‘minimal’ 
because it allowed him to compare very different cases, simply defining religion as 
‘belief in spiritual beings’.21 Definitions which refer to ‘gods’, the ‘supernatural’ or the 
like in a comparative and social scientific manner rather than stipulating the actions of 
‘the divine’ theologically, follow this path. 
Durkheim however defined religion differently as ‘a unified set of beliefs and 
practices relative to sacred things.’22 ‘Sacred’ here refers to anything which is of 
overwhelming significance to a group of people. Their ‘religion’ is the system of 
institutions, symbols, behaviours and beliefs surrounding these sacred things. The 
problem with this approach is that it could potentially include almost anything, 
including the ‘nation’, indeed Durkheim himself made this comparison.23 This would 
certainly render any discussion of the relationship between ‘religion’ and ‘national’ 
identity utterly meaningless, one could discuss ‘Christianity’ and ‘Scottish nationalism’ 
but both could be categorised as ‘religion’.   
In order to model the changing relationship between religion and national identity in 
Scotland, I would argue that a Neo-Tylorian definition of religion would be more 
useful. For me then, religions are groups with a set of socially inculcated beliefs and 
practices at least nominally or partially based around claimed extra-natural beings, 
 
20 William E. Arnal, ‘Definition’, in Braun and McCutcheon (eds), Guide to the Study of Religion, p. 26. 
 
21 E. B. Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, 
Art and Custom, Vol. 1 (London: John Murray, 1871), p. 424. See also Paul François-Tremlett, Liam T. 
Sutherland and Graham Harvey (eds), Edward Burnett Tylor, Religion and Culture (Oxford: Bloomsbury 
2017). 
 
22 Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. by Carole Cosman (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001 [1912]), p. 46. 
 
23 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, pp. 332-333. 
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forces or realms.24 While the role such claims play may vary or change it is these factors 
which make a group ‘religious’, the very fact that groups or institutions may become 
more or less religious in this way means that a restricted definition is all the more useful 
to model this shift.   
 
DEFINING NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 
 
‘Nationalism’ can also be a problematic term, largely because it is often associated with 
racism, xenophobia, chauvinism and violence, and is often used pejoratively to describe 
political opponents: during the independence referendum, campaign representatives of 
both sides used it in this way. The problem is that usage can slide from a general sense, 
referring to overt expressions of national identity especially when tied to some political 
goal to the more specific, negative sense indicated above. As with religion, scholars 
must ‘imagine’ nations and nationalism in a manner that is conducive to their aims.  
In this case emic and etic usages differ, far more so than with ‘religion’. Scholars of 
nationalism are interested in explaining the rise of the movements which transformed 
the world into a system of ‘nation-states’, rather than empires, feudal kingdoms or city-
states (defined partially by the shift from indirect to direct rule in the former cases) from 
the late eighteenth century onwards, and the diffuse ideology which underwrites this.25  
There is an unavoidable controversy regarding whether nations are modern or have 
older antecedents. Some scholars, including Scottish medievalists, have found national 
sentiment expressed in earlier writings.26 This article does not seek or claim to settle 
the thorny debate on the modernity or antiquity of nations, but undeniably there was a 
specific wave of movements which gained ground from the eighteenth century 
onwards, whether novel or not. Those movements sought to preserve and disseminate 
what they saw as their nation’s cultural heritage.27 They became increasingly political 
and Janus-faced, relating to a romanticised view of past history, but also looking 
forward to new unified or independent states bound by national belonging.28 
 
24 Liam T. Sutherland, ‘Tylor and Neo-Tylorian Approaches to the Study of Religion: Re-evaluating an 
Important Legacy in the Theorisation of Religion’, Paranthropology: Journal of Anthropological 
Approaches to the Paranormal, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2012), p. 53. At: 
http://paranthropologyjournal.weebly.com/home.html. Accessed 15 June 2015. 
 
25 Craig Calhoun, Nations Matter: Culture, History and the Cosmopolitan Dream (London: Routledge, 
2007), p. 18. See also Liam T. Sutherland ‘Theorizing Religion and Nationalism: The Need for Critical 
Reflexivity in the Analysis of Overlapping Areas of Research’, Implicit Religion, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2017), 
pp. 1-21. 
 
26 Fiona Watson, ‘The Enigmatic Lion: Scotland, Kingship and National Identity in the Wars of 
Independence’, in Dauvit Broun, Richard J. Finlay and Michael Lynch (eds), Image and Identity: The 
Making and Re-Making of Scotland Through the Ages (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishing, 1998), p. 
31. 
 
27 Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival: A Comparative Analysis of the Social 
Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations, trans. by Ben Fowkes (New 
York: Colombia University Press, 2000 [1985]), p. 22. 
 
28 Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism (Edinburgh: New Left Books, 1977), 
pp. 348-349. 
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Ernest Gellner defined nationalism as ‘a political principle which holds that the 
political and the national unit should be congruent’.29 It is unclear, though, whether this 
would include only pro-independence movements, such as Yes Scotland or whether 
this net could be cast much wider. I would argue it should, and therefore define 
‘Nationalism’ as:  
 
the principle that the world is made up of nations, peoples on whose 
behalf the right to self-determination — to decide their political or 
constitutional status — is claimed whether this entails independence or 
not. ‘Nations’ can be distinguished from other groups by this sense of 
sovereignty whether statehood is achieved or sought.30  
 
Yet these nation-states cannot be the exclusive focus, as a sense of peoplehood and self-
determination had to be disseminated and maintained before and after their foundation. 
In answer to the question ‘Why do we never forget that we are members of a nation?’ 
Michael Billig opines national belonging and the principles on which it rests are 
reinforced by ‘banal nationalism’; symbols such as flags, currency, and discourses 
which reinforce national belonging continually, especially as they go largely unnoticed, 
being part of the shared environment.31  
My usage of ‘state’ here conforms to the concept of ‘sovereign state’ prevalent 
within the discipline of international relations, Dunne and Schmidt offer a definition 
based on Max Weber’s seminal definition: [a state is] a legal territorial entity composed 
of a stable population and a government; it possesses a monopoly over the legitimate 
use of force; its sovereignty is recognised by other states in the international system.32 
As Scotland did not become independent in 2014 it does not meet this definition of a 
‘state’, and can still be described as a ‘stateless’ nation alongside other cases such as 
Catalonia, Quebec and numerous others.33 
 
29 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1983), p. 1. 
 
30 This definition owes a debt to various United Nations formulations. See, for example, UNESCO, 
‘Nation-State’, Learning to Live Together (2017). At: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-
sciences/themes/international-migration/glossary/nation-state/. Accessed 15 January 2019. 
 
31 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage Publications, 1995), pp. 6-8. 
 
32 Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, ‘Realism’, in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), The Globalization 
of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
p. 180. 
 
33 Obviously, different stateless nations must be treated as quite different cases. They relate to different 
forms of nationalist movements, depend on different boundary markers and have different relationships 
with the sovereign states which encapsulate them. However, various scholars have found it fruitful to 
study these cases in comparison. See, for example, Michael Keating, Plurinational Democracy: Stateless 
Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) and James Kennedy, Liberal 
Nationalisms: Empire, State and Civil Society in Scotland and Quebec (London: McGill-Queens 
University Press, 2013). Unsurprisingly, nationalist movements from stateless nations have also forged 
their own connections. The Catalan independence movement has found strong support among Scottish 
independence supporters, especially exemplified by the pro-independence newspaper The National. 
After the suppression of the Catalan independence referendum, declared illegal by the Spanish 
government in 2017, one of the ex-ministers of the Catalan government, Clara Ponsanti, sought refuge 
in Scotland. Andrew Learmonth ‘Catalan Ex-Minister Clara Ponsanti Will Fight to Stay in Scotland’, 
The National, 26 March (2018). At: https://www.thenational.scot/news/16115336.catalan-ex-minister-
clara-ponsati-will-fight-to-stay-in-scotland/. Accessed 15 January 2019. 
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THE CASE OF SCOTLAND 
 
Stateless nations such as Scotland form an interesting case. The fact that they are both 
defined as nations and as stateless would seem to contradict the prevalence of the value 
of national self-determination. Stateless nations are however vital to the study of 
nationalism because most nation-states were initially stateless nations. Scotland 
certainly did not lack the kind of romantic cultural movements discussed above. Indeed, 
the romanticism of James Macpherson, Walter Scott and others, and the invented 
traditions of modern tartan kilts and Highland games is sometimes considered an 
especially prominent and even prototypical case,34 contemporary with similar 
movements around the globe.  
It could be argued that contemporary stateless nationalism shows late blooming, 
Scottish political nationalism has gained ground from the late twentieth century 
onwards. In his study of the politicisation of national movements, Miroslav Hroch 
argues that such cases were politicised too late after the transition to industrialism and 
liberal democracy to use their momentum to attain statehood.35 Yet Graeme Morton has 
challenged the idea of Scotland’s ‘missing’ nationalism, arguing that a Scottish political 
nationalism did develop in the nineteenth century, exemplified by the reverence for 
William Wallace. Wallace was revered because he fought against the conquest of 
Scotland, which for these Scots laid the foundation for the Treaty of Union.36 This was 
depicted as a union of equal sovereign nations in which Scotland was not dissolved;37 
this notion that the Scots assent to the union can be regarded as Scottish unionist 
nationalism. Arguably it is the competition between Scottish unionist and Scottish 
separatist nationalisms which defined the referendum and Scottish politics in general.   
This is not the only distinction in Scottish nationalism, however, and religion has 
played a crucial role here. These nineteenth century cultural movements differed 
according to the parts of the Scottish past that they related to. So, for some the 
Presbyterian identity of the nation and the history of the Scottish Reformation was the 
most significant. This was not significant to all, however, and this could explain the 
wider appeal of the medieval past,38 and the traditions described by Tom Devine as 
‘Highlandism.’39 This is arguably easier for multiple groups to appropriate as 
 
 
34 Nairn, The Break-up of Britain, pp. 114-115. 
 
35 Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival, p. 28. 
 
36 Graeme Morton, ‘What If?: The Significance of Scotland’s Missing Nationalism in the Nineteenth 
Century’, in Broun, Finlay, and Lynch (eds.), Image and Identity Image and Identity, p. 16. 
 
37 Morton, ‘What If?: The Significance of Scotland’s Missing Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century’, 
p. 165. 
 
38 Michael Lynch, ‘A Nation Born Again?  Scottish Identity in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, 
in Broun, Finlay, and Lynch. (eds), Image and Identity, p. 82. 
 
39 Devine, The Scottish Nation, p. 233. 
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exemplified by the creation of Jewish,40 Muslim, 41 Sikh42 and Samyé Sangha (Tibetan 
Buddhist)43 tartans. As the significance of Presbyterianism itself has declined it is 
hardly surprising that the significance of Presbyterian collective memory has faded for 
many if not all, while other narratives remain or became more significant. 
 
RELIGION, MEMORY AND SYMBOLISM 
 
Ernest Renan famously argued that nations were as much subject to collective amnesia 
as collective memory.44 As Anthony Smith pointed out, national communities have so 
much historical background it is hardly surprising that individuals are selective45 and 
should not be assumed to be simply naïve or dishonest. People will select things which 
they can relate to and from which shared myths, memories, symbols and values can be 
constructed. After all, would any modern Scot who relates to Scotland’s medieval past 
either advocate the political and religious characteristics of the era or be unaware of 
them? The narratives, symbols and references derived from the Scottish past arguably 
form a ‘shared culture’. 
The banal symbolism discussed by Billig arguably has wider applications than 
nationalism, to all manner of norms in a given society, such as religion. Given the 
ubiquity of Christianity in Scottish history as reflected in symbols and other influences, 
this makes an interesting case for the power of the banal. Christian symbolism could be 
described as a victim of its own success, having faded into the background so much it 
has lost the power to reinforce its ‘message’. However, symbols and narratives are also 
not sui generis; they are dependent on the people in question. So, it would not be 
accurate to say that the Christian past and its symbols are completely ignored, but their 
meaning has shifted according to how people relate to them. This is perhaps best 
exemplified by the way that contemporary Scots relate to the saltire of St Andrew. This 
is a banal symbol par excellence but one that is now primarily a national symbol widely 
used by Scots of all religious affiliations. It could certainly be described as Christian in 
origin, representing the cross of a Christian saint. What is interesting is both its current 
status, coupled with the fact that its religious origins are widely known.  
Arguably, religion provides a different means of relating to the past because religion 
involves claims about extra-natural beings, forces and realms; but these elements can 
be combined with national ones. Christians can relate to the saltire as both a ‘national’ 
and ‘religious’ symbol, reflecting Christian heritage and, for some, the nation’s spiritual 
protector. In this case it relates both to a wider Christian identity and a specific national 
identity. Presbyterians may relate to John Knox or the Covenanters not only as specific 
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figures of national history, but also those that established the nation’s relationship with 
God. Prehistoric sites such as Callanish can be used to assert claims to primordial 
indigeneity, but for Neo-Pagans they may still be home to the same spirits worshipped 
by the ancients with whom they can relate. This latter case should be regarded as no 
more peculiar than the fact that modern Scots Christians claim to relate to the same 
saints or the same God as their medieval forebears.  
The coupling of religion and national identity in this way shows that specific national 
senses of belonging can be asserted that provides a local context for wider religious 
discourses, applying them to a specific country and its people. In this way specific 
national belonging is placed in the wider cosmos postulated by the specific religious 
group. Non-religious Scots also have their wider worldview into which their 
Scottishness fits, including systems of norms such as secularism and claims about 
reality such as naturalism (both of which many religious share alongside norms and 
claims specific to them). The fact that actors can jostle such different identities is almost 
certainly because they relate to different things, the specific sense of shared peoplehood 
can be combined with very different claims about the cosmos. 
 
IMAGINING SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
Despite this article’s focus on terms and concepts, I am still primarily concerned with 
identifiable groups of people. Those groups are not only subject to distinct emic 
classifications but can also be distinguished according to etic criteria which I have 
imposed on them. They are, however, all social groups and modelling their relations 
necessitates acknowledgement of shared characteristics as much as divergent ones. 
Obviously, as the census indicates, respondents are capable of juggling ‘membership’ 
of a variety of such groups partially because they are classified distinctly and partially 
because they can be fitted together in various ways.  
Scottish national identity is bound up with the territory of Scotland itself in which 
various religious affiliations exist and which can no longer be monopolised by any of 
them. in another sense, however, Scotland is part of the international networks defined 
by these religious groups, especially widespread, universalising and proselytising 
religions such as the Roman Catholic Church. Non-proselytising religions, however, 
such as Judaism also form a larger network along with similar diasporic communities, 
who may juggle Scottish national identity with a diasporic ethnic or national identity 
and even ‘vicarious nationalism’ for the homeland.46 They may form a minority within 
Scotland, but they form part of a larger community worldwide. 
As Benedict Anderson has argued one of the distinctive features of nations is the 
fact they are ‘at once limited and sovereign.’47 In a sense, Scottish national identity does 
not compete with these identities on a global (and indeed cosmic) stage and no religious 
group is currently capable of monopolising Scotland and Scottishness. All of these 
groups however conform to Anderson’s definition of nations as ‘imagined 
communities’ that is groups defined by imagining oneself part of a large and 
anonymous body of people who one will mostly never meet. Anderson did not mean 
that such communities are fake, inauthentic or unreal but rather defined by an act of the 
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mind which would certainly entail social inculcation48. To a large extent the 
characteristics and relations between such imagined communities depend on how they 
are imagined by actors, which are then subject to the imagination of scholarship.  
One of the most crucial factors here is the characteristics of the boundaries between 
groups. Frederik Barth argued that ethnic groups depend on the conscious identification 
of members and should be defined largely by the factors used by members to demarcate 
the boundaries of the group rather than ‘objectively’ identifiable features49. I would 
argue that this approach is useful for our understanding of the interaction of many types 
of social groups. Crucially Barth argued that the boundaries were more important than 
the ‘personnel’ within them, some of whom would migrate between these bounded 
groups50. Similarly, Craig Calhoun has described these as large, social categories which 
for him should best be viewed as categories rather than ‘organic’ communities defined 
by ‘face to face’ interaction or kinship.51  
Arguably what allows individuals to be members of such different bounded 
imagined communities is the fact that their boundaries largely do not conflict and are 
defined differently, facilitated by contemporary discourses of ‘religion’ and 
‘nationality’ as distinct classifications. That is not to say that individuals do not 
integrate their identities in various ways, leading to the formation of composite and 
novel social categories such as ‘Scottish Muslim’. The composite and novel 
characteristics of such a category does not make it any less of a real part of the lives of 
many individuals, a bounded and imagined community as valid as any other. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The relationship between ‘religion’ and ‘national’ identity in Scotland is informed by 
the fact that in contemporary discourse these are treated as completely distinctive 
categories. Classifying oneself in such a manner is part of the prevalent way of thinking 
and talking about the interaction and convergence of these social groups and collective 
identities which individuals may participate in. ‘Religion’ and ‘nation’ are insider-emic 
categories in Scotland but I would argue that some of the distinctive features of these 
social groups means that they can also be transformed into successful etic categories 
and the relationship between them modelled. The fact that the boundaries demarcating 
‘national’ and ‘religious’ groups largely do not conflict, and that Scottish national 
identity is no longer defined by ‘religious’ factors helps to explain the fact that 
individuals can juggle Scottish national identity with a plurality of religious affiliations.    
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